

00240004-8

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COUNTRY USSR

SUBJECT Research, Development, Production, and Procurement of Quartermaster Materiel.

25X1

PLACE
ACQUIRED --

DATE
ACQUIRED BY SOURCE

DATE OF INFORMATION

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. ONE REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS AUTHORIZED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

25X1

SOURCE

1. Q. Research and Development--What agencies are charged with research and development of quartermaster type individual clothing and equipment, and organizational equipment? Give location of these installations. Does the Soviet Army study Arctic equipment, techniques, etc of other countries such as Sweden and Finland?
- A. The Ministry of Armed Forces maintains special laboratories and institutes for this purpose. [redacted] the institute at Viborgskaya Storona, Leningrad. This institute is located in the large area (several square blocks) occupied by the arsenal situated in this section of Leningrad. [redacted] this institute, [redacted] concerns itself with research of special equipment, e g winter equipment, but further details are unknown to me. The factory, Krasny Vednik, located in the Narvskiy Vorota section of Leningrad has a research unit of the Ministry of Armed Forces concerned with development of equipment manufactured at the plant, which includes tents for all purposes and parachutes. The same Ministry maintains another research institute in Moscow, but I know nothing about it. I might add that the study of foreign armies is the concern of every unit of the Soviet Army. Thus, not only officers but even enlisted personnel are trained in the recognition of uniforms, emblems, equipment, and order of battle of foreign armies. Since World War II, two hours a week have been set aside for such training, in which visual aids are used as far as possible. Obviously, this study is superficial and is limited to major armies, e g the US, British, and French.

25X1

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION

ORB EV

ILLEGIB

SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION

25X1

- 2 -

2. Q. Production--In the production of standard quartermaster-type material, are quartermaster officers assigned to the factory staff as inspectors? Are any such type plants owned and operated by the army?
- A. In every factory handling military orders, a voyen pred (military representative) controls the type and quality of production on such orders. The director of the factory is not authorized to receive and process military orders without the signature of the voyen pred. An arbitrary example may illustrate the procedure of military procurement: The quartermaster of the Twelfth Cavalry Division orders harness for the horses of the division. For this purpose, he has to obtain the permission of the commanding general of his military district. With the authorized order form, he goes to the factory manufacturing harnesses and hands the order to the factory director, who turns it over to the voyen pred at the factory (probably a company grade officer, perhaps a major). The voyen pred may countersign the order to indicate acceptance. Alternately, he may refuse to accept the order; in the latter case, he must cite reasons for his action to the commanding general of the military district governing the ordering unit and request further instructions. In most cases, the voyen pred is a quartermaster specialist well trained in supervising the production of goods for which he is responsible; the voyen pred in a shoe factory is likely to be a specialist in shoe production, etc. The Armed Forces own and operate a large number of plants, some of which--curiously enough--do not limit themselves to purely military construction. Thus, all shipbuilding and aircraft factories are under complete military direction. The same can be said of a large number of steel and metallurgical plants. The connection with the military may be overt and accounted for in the national budget. In other cases, the plant may be outwardly under civilian control but actually operating under military ownership. Under indirect and secret military operation of a plant, it is sometimes easier to camouflage the nature of the end products and their use and to charge manufacturing costs to civilian agencies, thus artificially reducing the military items in the national budget. I understand that all tractor plants are under such covert military control. The working force of military plants consists exclusively of civilians. In addition to the director, each military plant has a voyen pred who accepts orders from military units. Among the purely military factories, [redacted] in Leningrad: Krasny Vodnik [mentioned in paragraph 1 above]; Marksist, a leather plant; and Radishchev, a factory which processes leather produced at the Marksist plant. The purely military nature of such enterprises is sometimes obscured by the fact that they may sell by-products on the civilian market. Thus, Krasny Vodnik, which manufactures tents and parachutes, uses odd pieces of material to make aprons for civilian use. In addition to the purely military enterprises, up to 80 per cent of the "civilian" industrial establishments manufacture goods for military purposes. Often, these goods are identical with the civilian products. For example, Skorokhod, a big shoe factory in Leningrad, has different sections for the various types of production, but is not subdivided into military and civilian sections. It has a so-called OTK (section for technical control), which represents the Armed Forces. On the basis of orders on hand, the voyen pred selects the highest quality products of a section, e g soles, stamps them "OTK", and thus earmarks them for ultimate delivery to military units. For an understanding of the military budget of the USSR, it should be added that the Skorokhod factory charged 250 rubles for a pair of good boots sold on the civilian market whereas a military unit would pay seven rubles for the same boots. These figures, which were correct for the time [redacted] /July 1948/, show how military expenditures are buried even at low levels and demonstrate how impossible it is to determine the percentage of military production relative to overall production in the USSR on the basis of cost.

- end -

SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION